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THE ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF REGULATION BY EXPERTISE: 
THE GUIDELINES FOR RECOMBINANT DNA RESEARCH 
Roger G. Noll and Paul A. Thomas* 
The debate over recombinant DNA research raises a number of 
important issues of public policy. Receiving most attention has been 
the direct question about the social value of the research, considering 
its potential benefits and risks. Equally important, but receiving 
somewhat less attention, are a series of more general issues that, 
while illustrated by the debate over recombinant DNA research, are 
likely to recur in other contexts with increasing frequency. First, 
to what extent can and should society constrain and direct scientific 
research? Second, in making decisions that require the use of highly 
technical information that is possessed by a very restricted group, 
to what extent can society make decisions that are technically 
informed without in the process delegating the authority to make 
nontechnical judgments and evaluations to an unrepresentative techni-
cal elite? 
Although the guidelines issued by the National Institutes 
of Health (NIH) have been subjected to public review and are being 
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supplemented and amended by political jurisdictions ranging from city 
councils to the U.S. Congress, the essential feature of the approach 
that has been taken to date to control recombinant DNA research is 
professional self-regulation. The molecular biologists who do this 
research have established the grounds for debate. Specifically, most 
of the discussion has focused on classifying the range of recombinant 
experiments according to the direct risk they pose to humans and 
assigning to each class a set of safety rules, ranging from outright 
bans to good laboratory procedures under normal circumstances. More­
over, for the most part implementation of the guidelines is left to 
the scientists who are in charge of the research. The NIH guidelines 
provide no enforcement mechanisms other than the requirement that' 
grants from NIH be given only to institutions that agree to abide by 
them. 
Although government organizations at all levels have 
attempted to review most of the features of the guidelines, government 
actions thus far have been primarily to consider enforcement mecha­
nisms that would cause all researchers, including those not supported 
by NIH, to abide by the guidelines or face st�ff penalties. NIH is 
not a regulatory agency, and has neither the resources nor the mandate 
to engage in the kind of enforcement activities that are practiced 
by agencies such as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) or the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) . Consequently, 
the obvious first step for legislative and regulatory authorities is 
to add teeth to the guidelines. Meanwhile, the underlying conceptual 
model that molecular biologists initially applied to the problem.has 
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remained largely untouched by the process of public review. 
REGULATING TECHNICALLY COMPLEX ACTIVITIES 
Recombinant DNA research, like so many problems of technical 
assessment, is a public policy issue and a candidate for regulation 
for two reasons. First, the federal government provides most of the 
financial support for molecular biology. Consequently, the public 
naturally will ask what it is buying, and whether particular lines 
of research deserve more or less public financial support. Second, 
the public must bear most of the risks of experimental accidents. 
Even if an experiment is not financed from the public treasury, 
citizens still have a stake in the safety practices surrounding a 
.dangerous experiment, since an accident can lead to significant 
uncompensated losses to persons who play no part in the decision to 
undertake the experiment and, therefore, whose welfare may not be 
fully taken into account by whomever makes that decision. 
The Role of the Expert 
A necessary input to rational policy decisions about sophis­
ticated new technical developments is an assessment of the procedures 
and outcomes of the various ways the new technique can be used. Most 
activities at the frontiers of human knowledge, including recombinant 
DNA research, are fully understood only by highly trained experts. 
These experts must be involved in the public decisionmaking process 
if policy decisions are to be sensible. The problem for public policy 
makers is to devise a mechanism for gathering the relevant technical 
information and checking its authenticity and completeness without 
at the same time delegating to the experts too many aspects of the 
decision that do not depend on technical expertise. 
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The dangers in delegating too much authority to the techni­
cal expert are more complex than are generally recognized. In the 
debate over recombinant DNA research, the delegation problem receiving 
most attention is the direct stake in terms of financial and profes­
sional gains that molecular biologists have in the outcome. Cer­
tainly this issue is relevant. The biologists who do this research 
have years of professional training, substantial financial support, 
and the prospect of receiving professional awards and prestige 
hinging on the decision whether DNA recombinant research will be 
permitted. But this argument can cut both ways. The public's percep­
tion of the riskiness of the research, not the actual risk, will 
determine the amount and nature of research that will be allowed. 
Because of the technical complexity of the problem of assessing the 
risks, public decision-makers are likely to be somewhat uncertain 
about the technical information that is supplied by the experts, even 
if in reality the information is accurate and complete. If so, a few 
unnecessary safety precautions that eas,e public uncertainty may be a 
small price for the experts to pay in light of the.personal gains to 
be captured by those who engage in the research. Thus, if the 
research is fundamentally safe but its safety is difficult to prove, 
the personal stake that scientists have in the issue may well lead 
to unnecessarily cautious safety standards as an expedient. 
Nevertheless, the public uncertainty over risk assessments 
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by experts is a natural, rational response to the disparities in 
incentives faced by experts and by the public at large. Experts 
control the inform.. tion on which risk assessment is based, and they 
are likely to be willing to run greater risks than would be acceptable 
to the public at large. An obvious factor contributing to this dif­
ference is the personal stake of the experts in continuing the 
research that requires their expertise. But there are other factors 
operating as well. 
One of the values of research is the excitement of acquiring 
new knowledge, regardless of its immediate or prospective usefulness. 
Whether the specific project is unraveling the genetic code, searching 
for life on Mars, discovering the essence of physical matter, or 
comprehending more completely the behavior of complex social systems, 
the act of expanding the frontiers of human understanding is, to some 
at least, of considerable interest in its own right. Research is, 
then, a form of consumer good. Individuals can be expected to differ 
according to the value they place on increasing human knowledge for 
its own sake, without considering its practical benefits, just as they 
differ in their tastes for other purely consumptive activities. Con­
sequently, the costs that people are willing to bear in order to 
pursue new knowledge will differ from person to person. 
People who have chosen to do research on any particular 
topic are not likely to be representative of society at large in 
terms of their tastes for that research. First, technical experts 
understand more of the ramifications of new knowledge, and hence can 
derive more consumptive value from research than nonexperts. Second, 
anyone who pursues a particular line of scholarly research does so 
in part because it seems especially interesting to that person. 
Molecular biologists are a self-selected group. Far more people 
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have the ability and motivation to become molecular biologists t
han 
actually do so; others become physicists, lawyers, and even econom
ists. 
These decisions reflect individual tastes for particular kinds of 
knowledge, and it stands to reason that molecular biologists will 
find genetic experiments more interesting than will people who d
o 
other kinds of research or who have selected careers that do not
 
involve research. Third, biologists engaged in hazardous resea
rch 
are also self-selected in terms of attitudes towards risk. Ju
st as 
individuals exhibit different tastes for consumptive activitie
s•and 
occupations, so, too, do they differ in the amount and type of
 risk 
that they are willing to accept. If a particular line of work, 
whether using recombinant DNA techniques or lumberjacking, is o
f 
greater than average 'isk, people who enter that line of wor
k are 
li�ely to be, on average, either more risk-taking, or more opt
imistic 
in their beliefs about aspects of the field that are still in
com­
pletely understood, than are people in gen�ral. 
For the preceding reasons, the public at large is likely 
to be less than fully reassured if a particular 'group of te
chnical 
experts claims that their line of work is sufficiently non
threatening 
to society to be worth pursuing. What is safe enough to p
eople in 
one line of work is unlikely to reflect an evaluation of
 risks and 
benefits that is representative of the values of other m
embers of 
society. 
An additional problem of self-regulation arises if more 
than one area of expertise is relevant to the policy decision. If 
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a particular expert group regulates its own activities, it faces the 
same problem with respect to other groups of experts that society 
faces with respect to it. If other groups are consulted, the self­
regulated group loses autonomy and authority, but if it decides to 
handle all aspects of the problem itself, it will be likely to make 
errors of analysis in reaching its conclusions. From society's point 
of view, the quality of the ultimate decision regulating the activi­
ties, of experts will obviously be lower if relevant parts of the 
analysis underpinning the decision are overlooked or flawed, while 
informational inequities make it difficult to consult the affected 
experts without inadvertently delegating authority to them. 
The discussion so far has produced several reasons why 
citizens may want public officials to intervene in the self-regulatory 
activities of a particular technical elite. These arguments can be 
generalized to a simple proposition. The social desirability of a 
public policy decision depends upon both the quality of the technical 
information on which the decision is based and the extent to which 
the decision is representative of the tastes and values of the 
affected individuals. In certain arenas of public policy, one can 
acquire better and more complete technical information on one aspect 
of the problem only by sacrificing some of the quality of other types 
of information and/or the representativeness of the outcome. 
Measuring the extent to which a particular decision is 
unrepresentative of the decision that a society would make if all 
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members were fully informed is, of course, impossible, since the 
hypothesized cause of an unrepresentative procedure is the unavaila­
bility to all but the expert of the very information that would be 
necessary to make the measurement. Nevertheless, the logic of the 
preceding arguments leads to some qualitative predictions that can 
be tested. First, activities in which experts are already involved 
are likely to be regulated less tightly than are activities that 
have been well-defined and considered by the experts and that objec­
tively have equal potential risks and benefits but that have not yet 
been undertaken. In spite of the fact that precise regulation of on­
going activities is easier to devise because more information is 
available about it, looser regulations will be applied to areas of 
ongoing activity, all other things being equal, because experts 
already will have made personal decisions about and commitments to 
the ongoing activities. Second, an unrepresentative procedure is 
prone to overlook entirely or to analyze erroneously issues that call 
for the use of the tools of another discipline. 
AN EVALUATION OF THE GUIDELINES 
The NIH guidelines and the justifications accompanying 
them appear to exhibit these two characteristics of an unrepresenta­
tive outcome. The purpose of this section will be to offer some 
evidence for this proposition. 
Inconsistencies in the Guidelines 
The validity of the first prediction regarding inconsistencies 
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in the guidelines that are related to the pattern of ongoing work 
remains for the molecular biologists to determine, but to an out­
sider the results are suspicious. The NIH Guidelines contain several 
examples of either unequal treatment of roughly similar risks, or 
equal treatment of apparently quite different risks. A few examples 
illustrate the point. 
First, the controls on recombinant experiments involving 
insect DNA are essentially no more than standard good laboratory 
procedures, while substantially more stringent controls have been 
placed on experiments involving DNA from lower vertebrates and higher 
plants. The rationale for this and other differences in controls 
according to the species from which DNA is taken is that the less 
related is the DNA to human genes, the less is the risk to humans. 
Neither the guidelines nor any biological literature of which we are 
aware provides support for the proposition that this principle should 
extend to distinctions between insects and trees. Moreover, risks 
other than the problem of direct threats to humans should be con­
sidered. Humans and other species could be affected indirectly if 
hybrid cells entered and altered food or disease chains at any point. 
Thus, the distinction between insect DNA and other species subject 
to tighter controls seems without any real scientific foundation. 
What is clear is that Drosophila DNA has been used in some of the 
pioneering efforts in recombinant research, and that one user of it 
served on the committee that wrote the first draft of the guidelines . 
Second, the literature on the comparative properties of 
different hosts and vectors for recombinant DNA experiments suggests 
that some are more dangerous than others. The text and appendices 
of the guidelines contain several informative comparative analyses 
of alternative source-host-vector systems. For example, SV40, a 
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virus that is known to cause cancer in animals, is generally regarded 
as less safe than polyoma virus; furthermore, B. Subtilis, although 
less well studied than �· Coli, is regarded as likely to prove safer 
than the latter; and lambda bacteriophage, although less manipulable by 
experimenters, is regarded as likely to prove to be safer than the 
plasmids that are commonly used as vectors. The general principle 
involved in these safety judgments is that experiments are likely to 
be safer if none of the elements involved in affecting the DNA recom­
bination have a known niche in man or a closely related species. 
Nevertheless, in each of the three cases cited above, the controls 
proposed in the NIH guidelines do not distinguish between the more 
and less risky alternatives. 
The principal basis for the decision to treat these alterna­
tives equally is that more is understood about the genetics of the 
more risky alternatives, which is a result of the fact that the more 
risky alternatives have been more extensivel� used in experiments in 
molecular biology. Consequently, research on the characteristics of 
the alternatives would have to proceed for several·years before most 
of the interesting recombinant experiments involving them could be 
performed. Thus, the decision to have equal treatment of more and 
less risky alternatives is primarily one of expediency. Of course, 
the decision has the unfortunate long-term consequency that it 
provides no incentive for molecular biologists to develop alternative 
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sources, hosts, and vectors that promise to be safer or to use these 
alternatives if they are developed. 
The value of standards as incentives is illustrated by a 
recent example. The level of biological containment prescribed for 
the most dangerous experiments that the guidelines permit could not 
be achieved at the time the guidelines were originally proposed. 
Consequently, if some of the most interesting experiments were to be 
performed, a new host had to be developed that was satisfactory for 
experimental purposes but weaker than those then in use. Roy Curtis, 
III a�d his colleagues at Alabama succeeded in developing a weakened 
strain of E. Coli literally within months of the development of a 
demand for it. 
The point of the preceding example is that the guidelines 
should be regarded as more than a set of controls for existing 
experiments. They also set up incentives that will affect the 
future course of research in the field. The failure to provide 
incentives to develop less risky hosts, vectors, and sources of DNA 
reduces the chance that they will be developed or that they will be 
extensively used if they are developed. In short, today's guidelines 
not only affect the safety of current experiments, they indirectly 
affect the safety that can be achieved in the future. There is no 
evidence that this particular long-term affect of the system of 
controls that NIH has proposed was taken into consideration. 
The preceding discussion, of course, must be regarded as 
raising a series of questions, rather than constituting an indictment 
of the guidelines. Not being molecular biologists, we cannot be 
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certain of purely technical issues in this highly complex .field. 
With regard to the second prediction -- that important issues not 
within the range of expertise of the perpetrators of the guidelines 
would be overlooked or dealt with incorrectly -- the guidelines do 
exhibit conformance with expectations. 
The Technical Orientation of the Guidelines 
The major sins of omission of the guidelines have to do 
with their purely technical character. Essentially, the guidelines 
define the laboratory practices, physical layout, and biological 
containment required for the experiments that are permitted. 
Numerous other issues that bear crucially on the type and amount 
of research that will be undertaken, and the attendant hazards that 
society will face, have been largely overlooked in the debate about 
recombinant DNA research. 
One such omission is a comprehensive analysis of problems 
of human error. The guidelines specify certain training requirements 
and laboratory practices (e. g. , no pipetting by mouth) for laboratory 
werkers in labs in which recombinant DNA reseprch is taking place. 
As Paul Berg has observed, the regulations regarding physical contain­
ment in facilities at containment levels up to and·including P-3 are 
dependent upon the absence of human errors and outright risky short­
cuts that are known to take place in laboratories. Consequently, 
most molecular biologists regard the biological containment regula­
tions as far more important than those regarding physical containment. 
Even here, however, human error is a distinct possibility, owing to 
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mistakes such as confusing samples or, in the dark of night when no 
one else is watching, simply taking a short-cut. Undoubtedly human 
error can never be eliminated; however, the guidelines do not 
inventory the range of possible human errors that might be especially 
dangerous, and in so doing miss whatever potential exists for using 
the guidelines to avoid or ameliorate them. 
The debate over recombinant DNA research has also avoided 
examining the possibility of using budgetary allocations among types 
of research as a mechanism to alter the direction and safety of 
rec�mbinant research. The risk to society from recombinant DNA 
depends on the nature of the research projects carried out in this 
field, which in turn depends upon budgetary allocations by NIH and 
the National Science Foundation (NSF), the agencies that provide most 
of the financial support for molecular biology. Consequently, one 
mechanism for altering the societal exposure to risky experiments is 
to allocate more of the budget for research in molecular biology to 
other types of genetic research and to the safer varieties of recom­
binant research. In addition, budgetary allocations could be 
increased for developing safer host-vector systems. Historically, 
research scholars have been the dominant force in selecting the 
lines of research to be pursued and, therefore, the way that NIH 
and NSF spend their research budgets. As a result, taking a more 
instrumental view of budgetary allocations represents something of 
a break with tradition that would weaken the influence of molecular 
biologists in determining the directions of further research in their 
field. As the same time, the use of budgetary incentives may be a 
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more effective mechanism in the long run for reducing the riskiness 
of research than is direct regulation of the laboratory environment. 
Another omission from the discussion about recombinant DNA 
experiments is a serious, comprehensive treatment of the problems of 
enforcing the guidelines. The only federal enforcement activities 
that are contemplated in the guidelines are the threat of the loss 
of NIH financial support if the guidelines are violated and the 
creation of an oversight committee to inspect laboratories in which 
recombinant research is carried out. The committee would include 
nonbiologists from the local community. 
These provisions constitute a very mild enforcement system. 
The nature of the oversight committee makes suspect its ability to 
identify violations of the guidelines other than very gross ones. 
Moreover, the threat that a violation will lead to suspension of all 
NIH support to a university provides a strong incentive for a 
basically friendly oversight committee to avoid reporting violations, 
since members of a university community are unlikely to want to see 
the university placed in financial jeopardy. And even if a violation 
is reported, NIH is not likely to carry out the threat to cancel all 
of its grants to a major research institution without considering 
the motivation and severity of the violation. Of course this creates 
opportunities for politically expedient decisions that undermine the 
guidelines. The source of this problem is that a penalty system that 
imposes the same punishment, regardless of the offense, does not me.Ke 
much sense. Certainly, a failure to abide by the most stringent 
containment standards for the most hazardous experiments should be 
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dealt with more stringently than even a premeditated avoidance of 
some feature of the standards for an experiment with minimal adverse 
consequences. Yet any attempt to make decisions depend on severity 
and motivation converts NIH to a judicial authority without any of 
the normal legal safeguards of regulatory processes. 
Some of the ramifications of the issues not raised by the 
guidelines or to a significant degree in the debate about recombinant 
research are, of course, not within the existing ambit of authority 
of NIH. Without legislative action, NIH could not make a major 
change in its budget or impose a complex penalty scheme on violators 
of the guidelines. But it is reasonable to ask NIH and the community 
of molecular biologists to recognize the importance of dealing with 
these issues, to address them seriously, and to propose actions that 
Congress and other governmental units might take. The principal 
issue in the early interventions by state and local governments, such 
as California and Cambridge, Massachusetts, has been the problem of 
enforcement, rather than the adequacy of the guidelines. This is a 
rational public response to the cursory attention that has been given 
to enforcement thus far. Whether the guidelines can be effectively 
enforced at reasonable costs, both in dollars and in loss of freedom 
-0f inquiry, remains an open question. 
Benefit-Risk Analysis 
The primary sin of commission in the debate about recombi­
nant DNA research and the desirability of the guidelines has been 
the simplistic and largely inappropriate use of benefit-risk analysis 
16 
to evaluate the research. In debating the value of their research 
in terms of benefits and risks, the molecular biologists have over­
stepped the bounds of their technical expertise, with the result 
that crucial aspects of a valid benefit-risk analysis are omitted 
or incorrectly treated in the discussion. The following are but a 
few examples to illustrate the point. 
The principal benefits that are cited in the discussion 
about the value of recombinant DNA research, in addition to the over­
all contribution to human knowledge that the research will produce, 
are several commercial uses of particular kinds of recombinations. 
Among the specific possibilities mentioned are the production of 
insulin, hemoglobin and other body chemicals, the development of a 
cure for viral cancer, and the creation of plants that use atmospheric 
nitrogen. Among the issues missing from the benefit discussion are: 
(1) an assessment of the probability that any of these possibilities 
will be commercially attractive, (2) an estimate of the amount of 
time it will take for knowledge to be sufficient to make these 
objectives technically possible, (3) an estimate of the costs of the 
research that must be done before society will know whether commercial 
use of DNA recombination is worthwhile, and (4) the design of a 
comprehensive program of research that would cont,ribute to the 
achievement of these public health and agricultural objectives. Ea.ch 
of these is essential to calculating the net expected benefits of the 
program. To apply the benefit-risk model to a line of research 
requires developing a research program that maximizes the difference 
between t he expected benefits and costs of the activities. Some of 
the necessary component parts of the analysis are developing a 
calculus for comparing costs and benefits that are separated in 
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time (e.g. , how are risks and costs borne by the current generation 
to be compared to benefits and risks experienced several decades in 
the future?), estimating the probabilities associated with uncertain 
events so that expected values of their benefits and costs can be 
calculated, and relating each component of a program to the potential 
benefits. Nowhere in the discussion of the benefits of recombinant 
DNA research is there discussion of how current and proposed research 
projects will contribute to capturing these benefits, and whether 
the guidelines and the NIH research budget set up the proper incen­
tives for molecular biologists to pursue the lines of research that 
will make the greatest contributions to achieving these objectives. 
Nor is any discussion to be found on the relationship of alternative 
safety standards, including those set by the guidelines, to the cost 
of acquiring the knowledge that is needed to commercialize DNA recom­
binations. Nor is there an analysis of how alternative safety 
standards affect the kinds of benefits that ought to be pursued most 
vigorously and, consequently, the particular lines of basic research 
that ought to be emphasized. 
Another essential element to a benefit-risk analysis is to 
explore the alternative uses of the same resources and the alternative 
means to satisfying the same ends. Presumably a ban on recombinant 
DNA research would cause molecular biologists who do this work to 
switch to other kinds of genetic research. While the gross cost of 
this switch would be the knowledge that can only be attained through 
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recombinant DNA research, the net cost would be less since, presuma­
bly, other lines of genetic research would progress more rapidly. A 
question that requires answering in a benefit-risk analysis is what 
benefits from other lines of research by molecular biologists are 
being sacrificed or delayed by devoting significant resources to 
recombinant DNA research. 
Of course, the potential benefits of recombinant DNA 
research may also be reachable by other means. A precise statement 
of the benefits that might accrue from recombinant DNA research is 
that it may contribute to disease treatment, food production, and 
several other objectives, just as other lines of research may also 
make contributions in the same areas. A valid benefit-risk anaJ.ysis 
would estimate the extent to which some expenditures on recombinant 
DNA research would increase the chance that society will capture 
these benefits for a given total expenditure on all paths to the 
same ends. For example, is a better way to reduce the death rate 
from cancer to seek cures for viral cancer through recombinant DNA 
research, or to expand research on environmental causes of cancer? 
Or, if in the long run insulin supplies are likely to run short, 
how should emphasis be divided among recombinant DNA studies, research 
on other synthetic process, or expansion of supplies from animals? 
Related to the question of the selection of a comprehensive 
research strategy for achieving the objectives mentioned in justifying 
recombinant DNA research is the question of the best timing for 
various activities that might contribute to the attainment of these 
ends. In particular, one alternative to an immediate, up or down 
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decision on DNA recombination is to delay all or part of it. The 
discussion about the costs and benefits of further delays in pursuing 
this research has foc�sed on the costs -- postponing for the period 
of the delay the date at which the benefits will be reaped and losing 
national prestige if scientists in other countries produce successful 
research before Americans do. But the delay in benefits is trivial, 
indeed, if they are in any case unlikely to accrue for decades. On 
the other side, delay can be especially valuable if an activity has 
some chance of causing a catastrophic, irreversible event and if 
further investigation of methods to reduce the chance and impact of 
the event is likely to pay off in a relatively short period of time. 
At least two issues in the debate about recombinant DNA suggest 
that these conditions do apply in this case. One is the possibility 
that research that is as informative as the research now under way 
could be performed in a few years .if attention were focused on 
developing safer sources, vectors, and hosts. The other is the 
disagreement among molecular biologists as to whether there is a 
natural barrier to DNA recombinations between prokaryotes and 
eukaryotes. 
In any situation involving risks which have unknown 
,dimensions, one potential benefit of a research project is to acquire 
more information about risks without actually having to be exposed to 
all of them. Because technical experts disagree about the potential 
hazards of recombinant DNA, one criterion for evaluating current 
research ought to be th� extent to which its results will contribute 
to society's ability to comprehend and minimize the risks of further 
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research. An unfortunate feature of benefit-risk analysis is that 
its practitioners tend to think in terms of adopting an optimal long­
term solution to the problem of decisionmaking under risk, as if 
guns were being held to the heads of decisionmakers to make final 
decisions on the basis of current information. But if some research 
activities are known to avoid risks that are endemic to other 
activities but, at the same time, to contribute to the information 
upon which further risk assessments will be made, it may make sense 
to pursue the former activities even if their direct contribution 
to ultimate societal objectives is less than that which the latter 
activities are likely to make. 
Is Benefit-Risk Analysis Appropriate? 
Perhaps more fundamental than the preceding issues con­
cerning the requirements of a valid benefit-risk analysis is whether 
DNA recombinant research ought to be evaluated in this way at all. 
To approach the problem with this frame of reference is to adopt the 
view that research is primarily an investment to achieve normal 
economic ends. If so, the first immediate question is whether govern­
ment should be involved at all in commercializing molecular biology, 
If, as seems likely, hybrids created from recombinant DNA research 
are patentable, is it plausible that drug companies and other private 
firms lack sufficient incentives to develop hybrids and, therefore, 
that government must be the principal source of support for this 
research? Moreover, if these companies do lack sufficient incentives, 
is it not more appropriate that government should subsidize corporate 
research in this area on the grounds that private industry is more 
likely to pursue cost-minimizing programs that are more closely 
directed to achieving commercialization than is the scholarly 
research community? 
The principal consequence of selecting research projects 
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on the basis of their returns as investments is that the basis for 
selecting them must be other than the scientific interests and 
curiosities of the researcher. A project can be of scientific 
interest because it requires a display of virtuoso technique, because 
it resolves a technical dispute that has no practical consequence, or 
because, after the fact, it turns out to have provided some new 
insight that was completely unanticipated. In these respects, 
research is more like a novel or a work of art than like a capital 
investment, and these features are likely to be ignored if research 
is to be regarded as another form of investment. 
Society may commit public funds for research for numerous 
reasons: it may value more knowledge for its own sake, it may regard 
research as a necessary cost of maintaining a system of higher educa­
tion (without the possibilities for research, could as many good 
medical schools be operated?), or it may be governed by a winning 
political coalition that includes the research community, along with 
the beneficiaries of tax shelters, and that succeeds in redistributing 
income in favor of itself. Whatever the reason, the resulting 
structure of research will be quite different if projects are not 
selected strictly on the basis of their�� likely contribution 
to some particular instrumental end. In particular, the system of 
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diverse, independent research scholars who individually control their 
selection of research topics and collectively determine how research 
dollars shall be spend, which projects are most interesting, and what 
proposals should be publicly supported, is not consistent with an 
instrumental, investment-oriented, "Big Science" model of research. 
Moreover, the relationship between society and research is far dif­
ferent in the two systems. In the science-as-art model, society may 
retrospectively alter financial support for research on the basis of 
several performance indicators -- the state of the system of higher 
education, the amount of interesting new scientific information being 
reported, and the spin-offs of basic research for practical ends -­
but the main issue with regard to the selection of future research. 
projects is whether they conflict seriously with other activities 
that contribute to society's welfare. This model is very close to 
the model of personal behavior in a free society; scientists are 
free to pursue whatever lines of inquiry they find interesting as 
long as they avoid direct harm to others. 
Recombinant DNA research takes on a different light when 
viewed against the science-as-art template. First, a particular 
activity that constitutes a relatively tiny part of research in 
general and that is a source of anxiety for large numbers of people, 
for whatever reason, is likely to lose public financing. Second, if 
the risks associated with a particular line of research are real, 
but nevertheless offset by potential benefits, the mechanism of 
undertaking the research is likely to be quite different than the 
customary academic research mode. In particular, government will 
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seek ways to do as little of the risky research as possible while 
capturing maximal instrumental benefits, to control research methods 
very closely, and to become more deeply involved in making ex ante 
judgments about the instrumental value of research proposals. Third, 
regardless of one's feelings about the ethical aspects of assigning 
burdens of proof, if the instrumental benefit of a line of research 
is not regarded by nonexperts as worth the risks that they perceive, 
the scientific community will bear the burden of proof in reducing 
uncertainties about the extent of the risks involved. 
CONCLUSIONS: THE FUTURE OF DNA RECOMBINANT RESEARCH 
Public policy making on recombinant DNA will be influenced 
by many factors other than the ones discussed above. Certainly if 
Congress perceives a significant risk in recombinant DNA, it will 
move to adopt more stringent controls than are likely to arise from 
a self-regulatory process administered by an agency with no enforce­
ment authority. But other realities will also influence the outcome. 
Perhaps the most important is that not all of the research -- or even 
most of it -- is likely to take place in American nonprofit research 
institutions. This means that regulations based upon the role of the 
federal government as the principal source of research funds for the 
nonprofit sector may deal with only the tip of the iceberg, particu­
larly on a global scale. 
Institutions are already in place that deal with the kinds 
of hazards associated with recombinant DNA research. For example, 
OSHA and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) can enter the arena 
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without further legislative mandate, and almost.surely will if they 
perceive recombinant DNA research to be risky and, in particular, if 
private industry begins to pursue this research with vigor. Moreover, 
if private industry is subjected to significant regulation in this 
area, universities will not be far behind. It did not take long for 
OSHA and the Equal Employment Opportunities Commiss ion to include uni­
versities within the ambit of the regulatory policies that they pursue. 
The first choice facing the government is whether to support 
recombinant DNA research. Although public officials may believe that 
society would be better off if the research did not take place, they 
really cannot accomplish this objective on a world-wide scale. 
Consequently, the decision about financing must be partly strategic 
-- how can the federal government provide financial support in such 
a way that the result:lng research is least threatening? Several 
considerations come to mind in this regard. One, as discussed in 
this paper, is to support research on the development of containment 
systems and source-host-vector combinations that are safer than those 
that are currently available. Another is to be far more generous in 
supporting the less risky lines of recombinant DNA and other research 
in molecular biology research than in supporting more risky projects. 
Still another is to attract as much of the research and commercial 
development into the public sector as possible by being perhaps 
unnecessarily lavish :in providing funds to create the optimal res1�arch 
environment for essentially any legitimate molecular biologist. 'l:his 
would maximize the extent to which knowledge about molecular biology. 
is in the public domain, and therefore minimize private incentives 
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to do the work by reducing the likelihood that private research 
would produce proprietary information. It would also give the 
government greater control in directing the lines of genetic research 
that are pursued. 
A second area of decisionmaking involves the selection of 
a system of controls on recombinant DNA research. An immediate step 
is to establish regulations regarding commercial uses of recombinant 
DNA before the first commercial use emerges. The nature of these 
regulations will affect the incentives private industry has to pursue 
this research; obviously a ban on commercialization backed up by 
criminal penalties represents an extreme action that would immediately 
stop most private research in the field. Alternatives include 
licensing and inspection procedures through an agency such as FDA, 
EPA, or OSHA. Serious examination of the problems of preventing 
severe accidents with commercial quantities of recombinant DNA hybrids 
will contribute to more than the ·development of a regulatory policy 
that is probably inevitable. It will also shed additional light on 
the nature of the risks of this research in general and upon the 
likelihood that extensive commercialization is a real possibility. 
With regard to scholarly research, Robert Sinsheimer's 
proposal to limit federally supported research to government-owned 
facilities deserves serious consideration. First, a few large 
government facilities are much easier to control than a diffuse 
system of small laboratories with differing designs and procedures. 
Second, such a system relieves universities of bearing most of the 
risks of the actions of their molecular biologists. Third, in 
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government facilities it will be easier to develop a coherent system 
of monitoring the performance of containment systems for the purpose 
of reevaluating risks and altering standards and procedures. Fourth, 
because government regulation must be accompanied by complex adminis­
trative procedures to satisfy Constitutional protections of due 
process, regulatory rules and standards are difficult to change. 
Government laboratories need not be subjected to these formalities 
and, consequently, can change safety procedures quickly in response 
to new information and contingencies. 
In order to make r_ational decis.ions on recombinant DNA, 
policy makers will need expert analysis and advice. To avoid some 
of the problems of inadvertant delegation of control to the experts, 
policy makers should consider assembling a panel of near experts 
whose training will enable them to comprehend the technical issues 
but whose professional pursuits do not involve recombinant DNA 
methods, and who thus suggest by self-selection that they are, on 
average, more representative in t heir tastes and risk assessments 
regarding recombinant DNA research than are the experts. The job 
of this group would be to translate and evaluate the technical case 
of the experts, and to raise further questions that may have been 
overlooked in the debate. 
In sum, federal policy should be based upon the notion that 
a well-designed program can redirect the focus of research in ways 
that reduce societal risks. At the same time, the federal government 
should probably abandon at least for the present, establishing policy 
towards recombinant DNA on the basis of future commercial spinoffs. 
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Instead, for a while the focus should remain on guaranteeing that as 
much of the research as possible will take place in carefully 
controlled environments and will contribute both to advancing basic 
knowledge about genetics and to reducing the uncertainties and risks 
surrounding research in this area. 
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